Minimal ring 0
Drivers, file systems and networking live outside the kernel, so a bug there does not run with full privileges.
Security / Least privilege
Having an identity does not imply having access. Every program starts with almost nothing and each permission is granted explicitly, as a capability that can be checked, delegated or revoked.
Access model for the manifest below. Each resource needs explicit permission.
Least privilege
init reads the manifest and hands over only those handles, in a fixed order. Asking for spawner, pci, framebuffer or input (the raw keyboard) makes it refuse the launch. Without a manifest a program gets the console and nothing else. Each desktop application has a capability of its own (launch, terminal, home, settings), granted only to that signed package. A program reads the clipboard only when the owner pastes into it, and only the owner can take a copy of the screen, at most once every 2 s and with a notice on it.
name = hello_app
caps = system, fs # no net, no window, no block
memory = 128K # DMA buffer quota
read_files = hola.txt # one shared file, read-onlyDefence in depth
Drivers, file systems and networking live outside the kernel, so a bug there does not run with full privileges.
Rust no_std throughout the trusted base; unsafe only where the hardware demands it, and every use justified.
A page is writable or executable, never both. Data cannot be executed, and the kernel image is read-only where it should be.
Kernel objects are reached through handles that carry a generation and a rights mask; revocation invalidates every copy.
With Intel VT-d each driver gets its own DMA domain: a device can only write to the buffers mapped for it. A mapped buffer stays alive until it is unmapped, a dead driver’s device is stopped before its memory is freed, and the addresses a device reports are checked before the CPU uses them. On the HD 4000, the kernel writes the GPU’s page tables and runs its own checked copy of each batch, and the EUs’ registers are cleared between clients (ADR 0083, 0086).
System images and application packages are signed with Ed25519 and checked with SHA-256 before they boot or install.
Updates go to the inactive slot. If the new system does not confirm itself, the loader returns to the previous one.
DMA memory quotas per application and a limit on running programs: nobody brings the system down by asking for more.
RustCrypto and the dalek crates for SHA-2, AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, Ed25519 and X25519, and rustls for TLS, after measuring them against ours; ECDSA and RSA verification, HMAC, HKDF and the kernel generator stay ours (ADR 0066, 0067). Certificate keys known to be compromised are refused anywhere in a chain.
Honest limits
Secure Boot with AriCodeOS keys is planned: today AriBoot verifies the signature chain, not the firmware. Address space layout randomisation (ASLR) is planned for a later phase. On machines without a hardware random source, the loader carries a seed across boots, so the kernel generator is strongly seeded from the second boot, and diag says what seeded it.